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UPDATED GUIDANCE ON CONSENT-TO-ASSIGN
PROVISIONS IN TEXAS OIL AND GAS LEASES
JASON E. WRIGHT
For decades it has been standard literature on oil and gas leases to note
there is uncertainty regarding how a court may treat the violation of a
consent-to-assign provision since, in Texas at least, such instruments are
contractual “leases” in name only.1 Some commentators have advocated for
courts to disregard their well-established nature as fee simple determinable
property interests and instead, apply ordinary contract law on the basis it
would be more fair to and in line with the expectation rights of individual
landowners.2 Others (such as this author) anticipated courts would be more
likely to adhere to traditional real property principles summarized in the
Restatements of Property to limit application of—and at times invalidate—
a freely negotiated consent-to-assign provision as an improper restraint
against alienation.3

* The author is a solo practitioner—J. Wright Law PLLC (www.jwrightlaw.com)—
based in Collin County, Texas, who handles all kinds of commercial disputes with a keen
interest in oil and gas matters.
1. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. 2003).
2. See, e.g., Luke Meier & Rory Ryan, The Validity of Restraints on Alienation in an
Oil and Gas Lease, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 305, 307–08 (2015–16) (arguing that property law
“labels … should not be mechanically applied to resolve the validity of restraints in an oil
and gas lease.”).
3. See, e.g., T. Ray Guy & Jason E. Wright, The Enforceability of Consent-to-Assign
Provisions in Texas Oil and Gas Leases, 71 SMU L. Rev. 477 (2018); Mark K. Glasser &
Scott Humphrey, The Assignment of Oil & Gas Leases: Conditions, Constraints, and
Consequences, in CTR. FOR AM. & INT’L L., 62ND ANN. INST. ON OIL & GAS L., at 37-38
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A recent decision issued by the Federal District Court in Amarillo
appears to be first to weigh in on the debate, although flying a bit under the
radar given it was issued in the midst of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
The opinion is worthwhile reading if you are an oil and gas practitioner in
Texas since—although not binding on a state court where most issues are
likely to be hashed out—the analysis provides a well-reasoned path for any
court to follow in assessing the enforceability of all types of consent
provisions and, further, collects a number of factors to consider in regard to
what may make a lessor’s refusal to give consent improper. The court’s
opinion will at least give commentators something new to write about going
forward.
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. BP America
Production Company,4 Judge Matthew J. Kacsmaryk of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas (Amarillo Division) was called
upon to determine—in the context of a preliminary injunction hearing—the
enforceability of a consent-to-assign provision. The provision provided the
defendant-lessee, BP America, could not transfer its rights to anyone
“except upon the written approval” of the plaintiff-lessor, the Mayo
Foundation, but with a further condition that such “approval shall not be
unreasonably withheld.”5 As discussed in a previous article by this author,
such consent provisions in a real property context appear to be generally
enforceable so long as not exploited to extract a “consent fee” or other
unbargained-for compensation. 6
Turns out, the Plaintiff in Mayo Foundation (who acquired its status by
charitable devise) had a particular aversion to the existing operator of
certain wells, Courson Oil & Gas Inc. Courson happened to have a
preferential right of purchase in its operating agreement with BP America
and exercised that right when Latigo Petroleum LLC (which, to muddy the
water further, was owned in part by the Mayo Foundation) made an offer to
purchase the lease from BP America. Courson also apparently had a history
of litigation with the Mayo Foundation over their oil and gas issues already.
When BP America came calling for lessor consent after Courson stepped in
to exercise its preferential rights, the Mayo Foundation naturally declined.
For unknown reason, it seems BP America concluded it did not actually
need consent as a legal matter either way and so, upon giving notice of its
(2011), available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d574433a-4d41-44839375-6ef6a0e73f11.
4. 447 F. Supp. 3d 522 (N.D. Tex. 2020).
5. Id. at 526.
6. See Guy & Wright, supra note 4, at 499-500.
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intent to move forward, the Mayo Foundation filed suit seeking an
injunction to prevent the sale to Courson. That was the best and perhaps
only course of action for the lessor to take since, if waiting to see what
transpired, the Mayo Foundation would have then been subject to a host of
other defenses like waiver or laches. 7
At the outset of the opinion, after summarizing the history of the land
and somewhat convoluted facts, the court cut through it all to recognize two
threshold legal issues: (1) was the consent-to-assign provision even valid at
all and, (2) if so, did the Mayo Foundation “reasonably” withhold its
consent in the circumstances. 8 Significant case law on both issues exists for
ordinary contracts and landlord-tenant matters, but there is little in regard to
what Judge Kacsmaryk called the “chimera” of an oil and gas lease. As he
noted vividly: “[T]he legal landscape on this question is less populated than
the Panhandle tract at issue in this case.” 9
Nonetheless the court immediately reached the same conclusion as this
author, and others, regarding the source of law for answering the questions:
i.e., Texas state courts would look to the Restatements to apply traditional
property principles and not ordinary contract law since the chimera at issue
is unquestionably a fee simple determinable in Texas.10
As such, Judge Kacsmaryk went on to rule that, as determined by
reference to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.4,
comment d (as well as the Texas Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements
on interpreting language in certain oil and gas contracts),11 a provision
requiring consent which cannot be “unreasonably” withheld is a valid
promissory restraint because the restriction facially does not bar alienation
to all possible transferees. 12 Interestingly, although dicta, the court
contrasted such a result with the language of the lease when held by the
original landowner—stating no assignment could ever be made at all—
7. See id. at 495-96.
8. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 529.
9. Id. at 530.
10. Id.
11. The Mayo Foundation court offers a summary on the rules of contract interpretation
otherwise applicable to Texas oil and gas leases, which in short can be articulated as: (1)
look to plain meaning first; (2) if the plain meaning is ambiguous, apply the canon of
construction against surplusage to find an interpretation that harmonizes with the rest of the
lease; (3) if still ambiguous, a court may investigate the parties’ intent in drafting; but, (4) it
is not appropriate to rely on industry usage or custom to add a nonessential term. Id. at 53031 (citing, among other decisions, the recent Barrow-Shaver Resources Co. v. Carrizo Oil &
Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471, 479 (Tex. 2019)).
12. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 532.
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which the judge concluded would likely be an invalid promissory
restraint.13
Mayo Foundation thus confirms the conclusion of those anticipating that
the public policy interests baked into real property law would prevail over
individual freedom of contract preferences despite any perceived (or real)
unfairness to individual landowners; leading to the following general
guidelines as to the various types of consent-to-assign provisions that may
be found in an oil and gas lease:
$

Promissory restraints (covenants not to transfer) – can be valid
or invalid depending on the language, but are not a real
hindrance either way given the remedy for breach is damages
and, in some cases, they can subject the lessor to substantial
liability and damages if not acting reasonably.

$

Disabling restraints (seeking to “void” a transfer) – are always
deemed invalid as a matter of law.

$

Forfeiture restraints (elimination of lease rights for violation) –
are invalid except in the exceedingly unusual circumstance
where a lessor negotiated to prevent one particular company
from acquiring the mineral rights and also retained a right of
reversion to remedy the violation.

More detail on the nuances, with strategies to consider in various scenarios,
can be found in a prior article co-authored with T. Ray Guy published by
the SMU Law Review in 2018.14
After answering the question of enforceability, the Mayo Foundation
court proceeded on to where virtually none other in Texas has gone before:
assessing whether or not consent was reasonably withheld in the context of
an oil and gas lease and, if not, the consequences for doing so. As Judge
Kacsmaryk highlighted further in that regard: “[i]f the Texas jurisprudence
on the first question of validity is sparsely populated, the Texas
jurisprudence on the second question of reasonableness is absolutely
barren.”15
13. Id.
14. See Guy & Wright, supra note 4, at 497-504.
15. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 532 (emphasis in original). That is presumably in reference to oil
and gas leases only, as there are well-known standards for what is commercially reasonable
in the context of contracts and landlord-tenant leases. See, e.g., 29 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 74:22 (4th ed. 2017) (listing factors and noting: “Denying consent solely on
the basis of personal taste, convenience, or sensibility is not commercially reasonable. It is
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Searching for guidance, Judge Kacsmaryk looked to case law in other
states, oil and gas treatises, and law review articles to determine what
factors to consider in deciding whether lessor (the Mayo Foundation) acted
reasonably in withholding its consent. The court found the possible factors
to consider might include:
$

The proposed assignee’s (Courson’s) solvency and record on
making timely royalty payments;

$

The proposed assignee’s reputation in the industry for honesty
and reliability;

$

The proposed assignee’s prior working relationship with the
lessor;

$

The proposed assignee’s capacity to operate the leasehold in an
efficient manner;

$

Whether the proposed assignee is a “lease flipper” who will not
actively develop the property;

$

Whether the proposed assignee would increase non-cost bearing
interests, such as overriding royalties and production payments;
and

$

Possibly, based on one law review article at least, whether the
proposed assignee is a competitor of the lessor.16

In the procedural posture of a preliminary injunction hearing, it was on
the plaintiff (the Mayo Foundation) to prove, among other elements, that it
was “substantially likely to succeed on the merits of its underlying cause.” 17
The court did not say what the burden should be as to the balance of factors
but one can presume it would fall on the side of not preventing a transfer
from occurring due to the strong bias in Texas against restraints on
alienation.18
also unreasonable to deny consent in order that the landlord may charge a higher rent than
originally contracted for, since the lessor’s desire for a better bargain than contracted for has
nothing to do with the permissible purposes of the restraint on alienation, that is, to protect
the lessor’s interest in the preservation of the property and the performance of the lease
covenants.”).
16. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 532-33.
17. Id. at 528.
18. See Robbins v. HNG Oil Co., 878 S.W.2d 351, 363 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994,
writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“But it is Hornbook law and an axiomatic rule that restraints on
alienation are squarely contrary to public policy and are forbidden and disallowed.”); see
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Considering the evidence submitted in the flurry of pre-injunction
filings, Judge Kacsmaryk found the Mayo Foundation did not satisfy its
burden to show consent was “reasonably” withheld because, despite the
general animosity and litigation history no doubt documented well in its
briefings, there was insufficient evidence to legitimately conclude the
proposed assignee (Courson) was such an incapable oil and gas operator to
justify preventing a transfer on public policy grounds. 19 It could be said, in
essence, all the factors identified by the court pertain to that policy interest
of making sure real property is put to its highest and best use. Withholding
consent simply because one does not like a proposed assignee or for any
other individualized purposes—such as extracting a “consent fee” or
otherwise exploiting the desire or need of a lessee to transfer its rights to
someone who appears willing and able to develop the property rights—is
certainly not one of the factors identified in Mayo Foundation. Ultimately,
the court found only one possible factor “weigh[ed] decisively” in the
Mayo Foundation’s favor under the circumstances of that case: Courson
could be considered a “direct competitor” of the lessor—at least, in the
sense that, the Mayo Foundation was part owner of its preferred transferee,
Latigo Petroleum LLC.20 But that was still not enough for Judge
Kacsmaryk to pump the brakes on a transfer and wait for further
development of the case through litigation because he noted that no other
state or federal court had ever adopted such a rule. 21 Plus, the fact that
damages were available, as discussed below, likely factored into the
Judge’s thought process. In this author’s opinion, it is extremely unlikely
any court would ever adopt such a rule either because: (1) Mayo
Foundation presented a unique factual scenario and (2) allowing consent to
be withheld for an entity that has (or takes) an ownership interest in some
preferred transferee opens up the door to all kinds of “injurious

also Griffin v. Griffin, No. 10-08-00327-CV, 2010 WL 140383, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco
Jan. 13, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting the principle is considered “well-settled in this
state prior to 1909”) (citing Diamond v. Rotan, 124 S.W. 196, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Texarkana 1909, writ ref’d) (“That a general restraint upon the power of alienation, when
incorporated in a deed or will otherwise conveying a fee-simple right to the property is void,
is now too well settled to require discussion.”)); Procter v. Foxmeyer Drug Co., 884 S.W.2d
853, 862 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ) (explaining three purposes of restraints against
alienation).
19. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 533.
20. Id. at 533-34.
21. Id.
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consequences” for which property law has developed the general
presumption against restraints on alienation in the first place. 22
In the end, the Mayo Foundation ruling was based not only on a
determination that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of showing a
substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits, but also because it could
not prove the second element of a preliminary injunction—that the movant
would suffer irreparable harm.23 Judge Kacsmaryk, with an obvious flair for
descriptive writing, noted that damages at law would still be available to the
Mayo Foundation even if it turned out Courson were to “cheat Plaintiff on
royalties, strip mine the surface, and negligently permit all well heads to
rust to dust.”24 That is very much in line with the conclusion from the
Restatement that breach of a promissory restraint, as no more than a
covenant or promise, is not actually much of a hindrance to accomplishing
transfers with or without lessor consent. 25
In sum, in this author’s view at least, the decision in Mayo Foundation is
a thorough and well-written (if not entertaining at times) legal opinion that
provides further support for the conclusion that consent-to-assign
provisions in Texas oil and gas leases should be treated with respect. It also
provides, however, that no lessee or prospective purchaser should
necessarily feel constrained to cave into unreasonable demands of a
property owner/lessor bent on holding up a transaction due to their own
personal whims or desire to obtain additional compensation by way of a
“consent fee” or otherwise. The public policy goals of property law prevail
over individual contract rights when it comes to Texas oil and gas leases.

22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4, cmt. c (identifying the
following “injurious consequences” as reasons not to enforce a restraint against alienation:
(1) ”impediments to the operation of a free market in land;” (2) “limiting the prospects for
improvement, development, and redevelopment” of the land; (3) “demoralization costs
associated with subordinating the desires of current landowners to the desires of past
owners;” (4) “frustrating the expectations that normally flow from land ownership;” and (5)
placing one party “in a position to take unfair advantage of another’s need or desire to
transfer property”).
23. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 528.
24. Id. at 535 (citing authority for rights of a lessor to bring “multiple causes for
damages … to be made whole for violation of assorted implied covenants in Texas oil and
gas leases”).
25. See Guy & Wright, supra note 4, at 490 (concluding the violation of a promissory
restraint by transferring without consent “would most likely subject the assignor to damages,
which in many instances would be nonexistent with a simple change in identity of the
lessee”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

